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This paper develops a tractable, heterogeneous agents general equilib-
rium model where agents face diﬀerent costs of access to the educational
system. The paper explores the relation between inequality of opportuni-
ties (in the form of diﬀerential costs of access to the educational process)
and eﬃciency (the levels of human capital and output) . More precisely,
the results from the simulation of the model suggest that a higher level of
inequality of opportunities is associated with a lower level of average hu-
man capital, lower output per worker and higher income (wage) inequality.
In other words, the model (based on standard assumptions) does not pre-
dict a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equal opportunity in human capital
formation.
Keywords: Human Capital, Inequality, Equity-Eﬃciency Tradeoﬀ.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: J24, J31, O15, D33.
1Corresponding author. Address: Department of Economics, Brown University, Box B, Prov-
idence, RI 02912. E-mail: Daniel_Mejia@brown.edu. We are grateful to Pedro Dal Bó, Oded
Galor, Peter Howitt, Tom Krebs, Herakles Polemarchakis and participants at the Macro Lunch
at Brown University for many helpful suggestions. All remaining errors are our responsability.1. Introduction
Most of the literature that studies the eﬀects of income inequality on economic
growth through its eﬀects on human capital has focused on the role of credit
constraints. The main idea of this line of research is the following: relatively poor
agents don’t have the means to ﬁnance the accumulation of human capital and,
because they are credit constrained (that is, there is no way to ﬁnance the costs
of human capital accumulation using future earnings as the collateral for a loan to
pay the tuition fees), they end up either not investing in human capital or investing
very little. Furthermore, if there are decreasing returns to the accumulation of
human capital the ﬁnal outcome does not maximize the size of the economic
pie and therefore there may be scope for redistribution of resources from rich to
poor individuals which, in turn, increases the size of the pie. This redistribution
reallocate resources towards more proﬁtable investments given that the returns to
human capital accumulation are higher for those individuals (the relatively poor
ones) who have less human capital. The theoretical idea has been extensively
developed in the literature since the work by Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee
and Newman (1993). Further developments have been proposed by De Gregorio
(1995) and Bénabou (1996, 2000). Empirical evidence has been found in favor of
the hypothesis that inequality and credit constraints aﬀect human capital by Flug
et al. (1998), De Gregorio (1995) and Mejía (2003).
But the accumulation of human capital involves other complementary factors
as well. This has been extensively documented in a number of recent empirical
studies, some of which will be resumed in the next section. While some of these
factors can be thought as being non-purchasable (neighborhood eﬀects shaped
by local communities, family background, socioeconomic characteristics, genes
, provision of social connections, installation of preferences and aspirations in
children), others are not (pre and post natal care, parent’s level of education,
distance to schools and diﬀerent qualities of books, teachers and schools) 2.
If the previously mentioned factors are important in determining diﬀerences in
educational attainment across individuals, the distribution of this “socio-economic
characteristics” across individuals matters. In other words, if the distribution of
access to the schooling system is important, one should encounter diﬀerences in
educational attainment across individuals, even in economies with complete cover-
age of public school provision. This does not rule out the importance of the lack of
2See Roemer (2000), Bénabou (2000) and Dardanoni et al. (2003), among others.
2ﬁnancial resources to pay for the (monetary) costs of education3. As said before,
diﬀerent studies have already shown that they are in fact important. However,
this paper emphasizes the eﬀects of inequality of access to the schooling system on
human capital accumulation decisions made by individuals. Also, the model ad-
dresses the equilibrium relation between inequality of opportunity and eﬃciency.
More precisely, the model is used to study the relation between inequality of op-
portunities and eﬃciency, the latter measured by output per capita or per capita
human capital.
The paper is organized as follows: the second section reviews the empirical
evidence regarding the eﬀects of some of the complementary factors mentioned
above on educational outcomes. The third section presents the model and the
fourth section the results of the simulation of the model using a (well behaved)
distribution function to simulate diﬀerent degrees of inequality of opportunity.
The last section presents the main conclusions derived from the paper.
2. Empirical evidence on the determinants of human capital
Since the publication of the Coleman Report (Coleman et al., 1966) hundreds of
papers have studied the relationship between school expenditure and the eﬀects
of complementary factors on diﬀerent measures of educational outcomes in the
United States. More precisely, The Coleman Report found that the socioeco-
nomic composition of the student body had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on test scores after
controlling for student background, school and teacher characteristics (Ginther et
al., 2000). This ﬁndings attracted the attention of scholars and policymakers as
one of its main conclusions was that schools characteristics were relatively unim-
portant in determining achievement, while family characteristics were found to
be the main determinant of student success or failure (Hanushek, 1996). Since
then, many studies have used diﬀerent data sets and econometric speciﬁcations
to improve the estimates of the eﬀects of family background, parental education,
neighborhood eﬀects and many other socioeconomic characteristics on educational
3Family income has been found to have large explanatory power on longitudinal studies
of educational outcomes accross individuals. However, family income or assets do not only
aﬀect the individual’s capacity to pay for tuition costs but also many other factors such as the
neighborhood where the kids grow up, their health, and the capacity to buy complementary
factors to the educational process.
3outcomes4. In a study with more than 5,000 undergraduates at UC San Diego
Betts and Morell (1997) found that personal background (family income and race)
and the demographic characteristics of former high school classmates, signiﬁcantly
aﬀected the student’s GPA. This result was obtained after controlling for the de-
gree program in which the students were enrolled and the resources of the high
school attended. Moreover, they found that school eﬀects partially reﬂected the
incidence of poverty and the level of education among adults in the school neigh-
borhood. In a diﬀerent paper Golghaber and Brewer (1997) found that family
background characteristics had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on tests scores taken by 18,000
students in the 10th grade, even after controlling for school characteristics and
the results on a previously taken math test by the same students. They found,
for instance, that years of parental education and family income were positively
related to test scores. Also, Blacks, Hispanic and kids coming from a family with
no mother in the household had, on average, a lower predicted score in the math
test. Another study by Groger (1997) found empirical evidence on the negative
(and signiﬁcant) eﬀects of local violence on the likelihood of graduating from high
school. While the average dropout rate in his sample is 21 percent, minor vio-
lence increases the dropout rate by 5 percentage points, moderate levels of violence
raises it by 24 percent and substantial violence by 27 percent.
Data requirements in longitudinal studies to estimate the eﬀects of school
characteristics, family background and neighborhood eﬀects on educational out-
comes constitutes the main constraint to undertake research on the determinants
of educational outcomes in developing countries. However, the use of random-
ized experiments to estimate the eﬀects of changes in the complementary factors
(such as: improving health conditions, provide educational inputs, and lower the
costs associated with school attendance, among others) on diﬀerent measures of
educational outcomes has become one of the hottest topics in the development
literature5. T h el i s to fr e c e n tp a p e r st h a te v a l u a t et h ee ﬀects of improving the
accessibility of these complementary factors is growing rapidly and a complete
survey of their ﬁndings is not the purpose of this article. However, some examples
are worth mentioning.
4For a reviw of the literature, as well as the main ﬁndings (and econometric speciﬁcation
problems) the reader is refered to Ginther et al. (2000) and Hanushek (1986 and 1996). The
paper by Durlauf (2002) presents a complete review of how social interactions play an important
role on the perpetuation of poverty, altough, not only through the human capital channel.
5The reader is refered to Duﬂo and Kremer (2003) and Kremer (2003) for a review of the
methodology of randomized experiments as well as their main ﬁndings.
4One of this randomized experiments evaluates the eﬀects of mass deworming
in 75 school populations in Kenya. The results are very clear: “Health and school
participation improved not only at program schools, but also at nearby schools,
due to reduced disease transmission. Absenteeism in treatment schools was 25%
(or 7 percentage points) lower than in comparison schools. Including this spillover
eﬀect, the program increased schooling by 0.15 years per person treated.” (Kremer
and Miguel, 2001). The same pattern of results were found in a similar randomized
experiments in India (Bobonis et al., 2002, cited in Kremer, 2003).
In another randomized experiment conducted in Colombia, vouchers to cover
more than half of the tuition costs of secondary education in private schools were
distributed by lottery to kids in secondary school age from neighborhoods classiﬁed
as falling in to the two lowest socioeconomic strata6.T h ee ﬀects of the program
were estimated by Angrist et al. (2003) by measuring the diﬀerences in certain
characteristics and test scores between voucher winners and a control group of
nonparticipants in the program. After three years in the program, voucher winners
were 15 percentage point more likely to have attended a private school, were 10%
more likely to have completed the 8th grade and scored 0.2 standard deviations
higher on standardized tests given to the whole population (voucher winners plus
control group of nonparticipants in the program)7.
From the empirical evidence presented above it is clear that the role played
by complementary factors in the educational process is in fact important. In the
following section we construct a model where the degree of inequality of access to
the schooling system is a ﬁrst order determinant of the levels of human capital
and other economic variables.
3. The basic structure of the model
Consider a small economy operating under perfectly competitive markets. The
production of the (single) ﬁnal good is determined by a neoclassical production
function that combines physical capital, human capital and unskilled labor.
6Neighborhoods in Colombia are stratiﬁed from 1 (the poorest) to 6 (the richest), mainly for
purposes of setting utilities tariﬀs in a progressive manner.
7Other randomized experiments include: PROGRESA in Mexico (Schultz, forthcoming),
School meals in Kenya (Kremer and Vermeersch, 2002), Provision of uniforms, textbooks and
classroom construction in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2002), Provision of a second teacher (if possible,
female) in one-teacher schools in India (Banerjee and Kremer, 2002).
5Individuals are identical regarding their preferences and abilities but may dif-
fer with regard to the cost they face of acquiring human capital because they have
diﬀerent access to the complementary factors of the educational process, just as
explained in the previous section. In that sense, individuals face unequal opportu-
nities of acquiring human capital. The distribution of this costs across individuals
is assumed to be exogenously given. Given the costs of acquiring human capital,
each individual decides how much time to devote to acquire human capital (if
any), and then compares the income she would receive if she decides to work as a
skilled worker with that one she would receive if she decides not to acquire human
capital and work as an unskilled worker. In equilibrium, the aggregate level of
human capital as well as the output level are determined by the distribution of
the costs of acquiring human capital as well as on other parameters of the model.
Although unequal access to the complementary factors of the educational
process can be partially linked to wealth or income inequality, there are some
predetermined characteristics of individuals that cannot be modiﬁed and/or can-
not be purchased in the market once the time to make investment decisions in
education comes: pre and post-natal care, neighborhood eﬀects, parental level of
education, school quality, among others. In order to concentrate on the eﬀects
of inequality of opportunities on human capital investment decisions, it will be
assumed that all individuals are endowed with the same share of the total capital
stock of the economy and education is provided free.
3.1. Production technology and ﬁrm’s optimization conditions
The technology of production of ﬁnal goods combines unskilled labor, skilled labor
(human capital) and physical capital according to a neoclassical production func-
tion characterized by aggregate constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal







Where Lu is the proportion of individuals who work as unskilled labor, H is
total human capital in the economy, determined by H = Ls
_
hs,w h e r eLs is the
proportion of individuals that acquire human capital and,
_
hs is the average level
of human capital across those individuals that accumulate human capital and
therefore work as skilled workers. K is the aggregate capital stock. For the sake
of simplicity it is assumed that the total population consists of a continuum of
individuals of size 1. Therefore Lu + Ls =1 .
6Markets are perfectly competitive and ﬁrms choose the number of unskilled
and skilled workers they hire as well as physical capital in order to maximize
proﬁts. The inverse demand for each one of the factors of production is given in


















Where wu is the unskilled wage rate, ws i st h ew a g er a t ep e ru n i to fh u m a n
capital (deﬁned later on) and r is the interest rate.
3.2. Individual’s human capital decision and occupational choice
Individuals are identical in their preferences and abilities and each of them is en-
dowed with one unit of time which they allocate between working and acquiring
human capital (if any). However, individuals may diﬀer in the costs they face per
unit of human capital accumulated. As discussed in the introduction this assump-
tion captures the idea that diﬀerent individuals face diﬀerent costs of acquiring
human capital. Some individuals may be further from schools than others or may
enjoy less eﬃcient ways of transportation. Or, some individuals may not be well
enough nourished and as a result may face higher costs of attending school. This
assumption will be introduced in the model in a very simple way (probably the
simplest one): for each unit of time that an individual allocates to the accumu-
lation of human capital not only she sacriﬁc e st i m et ow o r kb u ta l s oh a st op a y
an additional extra cost. The skills of an individual i, who devotes a fraction ui
of her time to the accumulation of skills are determined by b(ui), and the total
time she devotes to work is given by (1 − uiθi).W h e r e θi ≥ 1,a n dθi − 1 ≥ 0,
reﬂects the additional cost of devoting a fraction ui of time to the accumulation
of human capital. When θi =1 , the individual faces only the cost of time devoted
to accumulate human capital and, when θi > 1, the individual faces two costs:
the time devoted to acquire the skills, ui, which is time that she sacriﬁces from
w o r ka n da ne x t r ac o s te q u a lt o(θi − 1)ui.T h i sl a s tc o s tr e ﬂects the additional
cost each individual faces of acquiring human capital. It can be thought of as the
time that an individual with constraints (θi − 1) h a st ow o r kt op a yt h ee x t r a
7cost for the acquisition of skills b(ui). It is assumed that θi is distributed across
individuals according to the distribution function F(θ).T h a ti sθ ∼ F(θ)8.
The total level of human capital devoted to work in the production of the ﬁnal
good by individual i who faces an additional extra cost of acquiring human capital
(θi − 1) is given in equation 3.5.
hi =( 1− uiθi)b(ui) (3.5)
It is assumed that b0(u) > 0 and b00(u) < 0. In words, there are positive and
decreasing marginal returns to time investment in human capital formation.
In order to simplify the analysis, assume the form b(ui)=u
γ
i ,w i t hγ < 1,
which satisﬁes the previous conditions.
Each individual in the economy chooses ui in order to maximize her total











subject to: uiθi < 1
The optimal amount of time individual i invests in the acquisition of human







Not surprisingly, the higher it is the additional cost of acquiring human capital
faced by individual i, the lower it is the time she invests in the acquisition of it10.
Given the extra cost each individual faces of acquiring human capital and the
optimal amount of time investment in human capital accumulation, she compares
the income she would receive under the two alternative occupations: If she decides
to become an unskilled worker, she would devote all her time to work and she
would receive an income equal to the wage of an unskilled worker. That is:
8In other words, each individual in the economy is ‘endowed’ with a value of θi which deter-
mines the cost she faces per unit of time she devotes to the accumulation of human capital.
9Note that uiθi =
γ
1+γ < 1.
10Note that from the optimization conditions an econometric especiﬁcations can be derived if
the resercher has some hypothesis about the factors that determine θi (see the Appendix (A1)
for an example).
8Income of an unskilled worker = w
u (3.8)
In the other hand, if she decides to be a skilled worker, she would optimally
invest a fraction u∗
i of her time in the formation of human capital and then, her
total income would be given by equation 3.9, which is obtained from replacing
equation 3.7 in the objective function in 3.6.








Each individual in the economy decides whether to work as a skilled or un-
skilled worker by comparing the income she would get under the two alternative
occupations (equations 3.8 and 3.9)11. More precisely, each individual i in the
economy takes the wage rates wu and ws as given and, depending on the extra
cost of acquiring human capital that she faces, makes an occupational choice.
Comparing equations 3.8 and 3.9 there exists a threshold value of the extra cost
of acquiring human capital given by equation 3.10 that determines whether each
individual decides to invest in human capital and work as a skilled worker or, work













Individuals who face a cost higher than the threshold cost θ
∗ will decide not
to acquire any human capital, whereas those individuals who face a lower cost
than the threshold value will devote a fraction u∗
i (equation 3.7) of their time to
the acquisition of human capital and will work as skilled workers. The optimal
occupational decision by individual i is summarized in equations 3.11 and 3.12.
If θi > θ
∗ ⇒ Work as unskilled worker and receive income = w
u
(3.11)
If θi ≤ θ
∗ ⇒ Invest u
∗
i in the acquisition of human capital,
11This setup is equivalent to one where each individual maximizes a monotonic utility function
that depends only on the consumption of the ﬁnal good.









The average level of human capital devoted to the production of the ﬁnal good

















Given that individuals who decide to work as unskilled workers do not invest
any time in the formation of human capital, the total level of human capital in
the economy is given by the proportion of individuals who work as skilled workers
(i.e. those who devote a positive amount of time to the acquisition of human
capital) times the average level of human capital among this group of individuals
(equation 3.13). Given the assumption that the total size of the population is 1,
the total human capital in the population is equal to the average human capital

















∗) is the proportion of individuals who decide to invest a positive
fraction of their time in the formation of human capital.
3.4. Labor market equilibrium
To determine the labor market equilibrium quantities and prices we need to deter-
mine the threshold level of the cost of acquiring human capital, θ
∗.F r o me q u a t i o n s















10From equations 3.11 and 3.12 we know that the proportion of individuals who
decide to work as unskilled workers is equal to 1−F(θ
∗), whereas the proportion
who decide to be skilled workers is given by F (θ
∗). Replacing these two results
and using equation 3.13 to replace for the average level of human capital across

















Equations 3.10 and 3.16 determine the labor market equilibrium. More pre-
cisely, replacing the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages from equation 3.16 in equa-
tion 3.10 and after doing some algebra, the threshold value of the cost of acquiring























Appendix A2 provides a proof for the existence and uniqueness of the labor
market equilibrium described in equation 3.17.
3.5. Human capital distribution
As discussed before, those individuals who face a higher cost of acquiring human
capital than the threshold cost, that is, θi > θ
∗, will not devote any time to the
acquisition of education and therefore will not acquire any human capital. The
proportion of these individuals out of the total population, as was shown before
is 1 − F(θ
∗). The remaining individuals will devote a positive amount of time to








. T h ea m o u n to fh u m a nc a p i t a lo fa g e n ti is inversely
related to the cost she faces of acquiring human capital. With this information we
can construct an approximate indicator of human capital inequality, that is, an
approximate Gini coeﬃcient. Figure 3.1, depicts the human capital Lorenz curve
implied by the model. Individuals are ordered in the x-axis according to the costs
they face of acquiring human capital from highest (at the origin) to the lowest (1)
on the right. Recall that the size of the total population is being normalized to
11one. A proportion 1−F(θ
∗) of individuals do not acquire any human capital and
t h e r e f o r et h eL o r e n zc u r v ei st r u n c a t e du pt ot h ei n d i v i d u a lw i t hθi = θ
∗. From
that point on, individuals devote a positive amount of their time to education and
start to have positive amounts of human capital. In ﬁgure 3.1, after the individual
with θi = θ
∗, the cumulative human capital is greater than zero, (and decreasing
in θi,a n dt h e r e f o r ei n c r e a s i n ga sw em o v et ot h er i g h to ft h eg r a p h ) 12.T h eh u m a n
c a p i t a lG i n ic o e ﬃcient is deﬁned as the area between the 450 l i n ea n dt h eL o r e n z
curve. From ﬁgure 3.1 the human capital Gini is deﬁned as:
Ginih =
A + B
A + B + C
(3.18)
If human capital were equally distributed across individuals, this area would be
zero and so would be the Gini coeﬃcient. However, as human capital is less
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Figure 3.1:
Although the Lorenz curve is non-linear after some threshold value, let us
12Figure 5.1 in Appendix (b) presents the Education Lorenz curves for two countries (Korea
and India) in two points in time (1960 and 1990) for each country. Note that the pattern of
the Lorenz curves predicted in the model (the fact that they are truncated) is observed in the
actual data. The reader is refered to Thomas et al. (2000) for details.
12deﬁn et h ea p p r o x i m a t eG i n ic o e ﬃcient as
∼
GINIh = A
A+B+C. This biases the
Gini downwards but greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. By calculating the area of
the triangles from the last formula, it can be shown that the approximate human
c a p i t a lG i n ic o e ﬃcient positively depends on the proportion of individuals who
decide not to acquire any human capital. More precisely, the approximate human







The higher is the proportion of agents who face a cost of acquiring human
capital higher than the threshold value θ
∗, the higher is the human capital Gini
coeﬃcient. In other words the measure of human capital inequality directly de-
pends on the number of individuals who decide not to accumulate human capital.
Although this is only an approximation, it seems to be supported by the empirical
evidence presented in Thomas et al. (2000). More precisely, the authors ﬁnd a
strong negative relation between average years of educational attainment and the
human capital Gini Index (see Figure 5.2 in Appendix (A3) taken from Thomas
et al. (2000)).
3.6. Income (wage) distribution
As explained before, agents are assumed to diﬀer only with regard to the costs
of acquiring human capital. Although this is a strong assumption, it is valid if
one wants to concentrate on the eﬀects of inequality of opportunities on human
capital accumulation. A more complete model would have to assume also het-
erogeneity of wealth as well as heterogeneity of opportunities across individuals.
For the moment we will assume that all agents are endowed with the same share
of the aggregate capital stock and as a result income heterogeneity arises from
heterogeneity in human capital and the occupational choice agents make.
Wage income of agent i in the economy is determined in the following way:
If θi > θ
∗,a g e n ti works as an unskilled worker and gets wage income equal to w
u
(3.20)
If θi ≤ θ
∗,a g e n ti invests u
∗
i of her time acquiring human capital and earns (3.21)







13As an example, imagine that the number of agents whose cost of acquiring
human capital is lower than the threshold value is relatively large, given a certain
value of the threshold, θ
∗.T h a ti s ,1−F(θ
∗) is large, given θ
∗. The Lorenz curve
associated with this example will take the form of ﬁgure 3.2. Quite a large fraction
of the population 1 − F(θ
∗) receives a less than proportional fraction of the total
wage payments, while a relatively small fraction, F (θ
∗), ranked by the inverse of
their value of θi, receive an increasing proportion of all wage payments.
% of wage income  
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In this section we present the main results of the simulation of the model. More
precisely, we specify a (well behaved) distribution function for the cost of acquiring
human capital (which is the only exogenous part of the model presented in the
last section) and then implement a mean-preserving spread to the distribution13.
13Altough this is a strong restriction in the kind of changes in the distribution that we allow,
it isolates changes in the dispersion of the distribution from changes in the mean. An interesting
but diﬀerent exersise is to allow for other changes in the distribution that do not necessarily
preserve the mean. We leave this for further work.
14T h er e s u l t so ft h es i m u l a t i o nw i l lt e l lh o wt h ee n d o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e so ft h e
model respond to changes in the distribution of costs of acquiring human capital
across individuals while keeping the mean of the distribution unchanged.
The following analysis describes the main characteristics of the distribution
used in the simulation as well as the main ﬁndings. We are particularly interested
in the results regarding the relation between human capital, skilled to unskilled
wages ratio, inequality measures and total output. As will become apparent soon,
the relation between eﬃciency (total and per capita output and human capital)
and inequality of income and opportunities derived from the simulation is negative.
Let the cumulative distribution function of the costs of acquiring human capital
be that speciﬁed in equation 4.1. That is, let θi ∼ F(θ), where:
F(θ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩














Where φ ∈ [1,∞)























Given that the mean of the distribution speciﬁed in equation 4.1 is constant
for all values of the parameter φ, any change in this parameter modiﬁes the shape
(dispersion) of the distribution while leaving the mean unchanged.
The parameter Ω is a measure of inequality for values of φ such that φ ∈
[1,2.25]14. We will use this fact to carry out the simulation. In particular, higher
14The details are available from the authors upon request.
15values of φ are associated with a more unequal distribution of the costs of educa-
tion across individuals.
After ﬁxing some parameter values15, the main point of the simulation is that
of ﬁnding the value of θ
∗ from equation 3.17 using equation 4.1. In words, this
is equivalent to ﬁnding the value θ
∗ such that the labor market is in equilibrium.
Recall also that the individual with θi = θ
∗ is indiﬀerent between investing a
fraction u∗
iof time in the formation of human capital (equation 3.7) and working
as a skilled worker and, working as an unskilled worker. Having found the value
of θ
∗, and using the form of the distribution from equation 4.1 we can obtain all
the endogenous variables of the model from the main equations derived in the last
section.
The next step is to modify the shape of the distribution by changing the
parameter φ. Then, for each value of φ ∈ [1,2.25] we obtain the value of θ
∗(φ)
(such that the labor market is in equilibrium) and all endogenous variables in the
model.
The main results are presented in the panels of Figure 4.116.F r o mt h et o pl e f t
panel (a) it is clear that a higher value of the parameter Ω is associated with lower
level of total (and per capita) human capital. In words, a more unequal distribu-
tion of opportunities (costs of acquiring human capital) is associated with a lower
level of average human capital across all individuals. From the top right panel
(b) the relation between human capital and wage inequality is negative. That
is, higher levels of human capital are associated with a more equal distribution
of wage income. The last two panels show the relation between output and two
diﬀerent measures of inequality. In lower left panel (c) the relation between out-
put and our measure of inequality of opportunities is negative. That is, a higher
level of inequality of opportunities is associated with a lower level of total (and
average) output. The relation between output and income (wage) inequality is
shown in the lower right panel (d). Higher levels of wage inequality are associated
with a lower level of output.
15We use the following parameter values: α =0 .3, β =0 .3, K =1and γ =0 .7.
16The diﬀerent curves presented in Figure 4.1 are not ‘smooth’ because the simulation of




The paper develops an heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model with un-
equal opportunities of access to the educational system. More precisely, we specify
inequality of opportunities among individuals as a diﬀerential cost of access to the
educational process. In equilibrium, the endogenous variables of the model are
determined by the form of the distribution of costs across individuals as well as
the parameters of the technologies of production of the ﬁnal good and human cap-
ital formation. In order to study the relation between the endogenous variables
of the model we do a numerical simulation of the model using a well behaved (for
our main purposes) distribution function of the costs of acquiring human capital.
More precisely, we ﬁnd a negative relation between inequality of opportunities
and income and two diﬀerent measures of eﬃciency (output per capita and hu-
man capital per capita). An additional exercise (not presented in this version of
the paper) uses a diﬀerent distribution function and the main results regarding
the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equality are maintained17. Although the dis-
tribution used in the paper for the simulation is very particular, it is a tractable
one in the sense that it allows to isolate changes in the shape (dispersion) of the
distribution from changes in the mean. We are aware that this distribution is
one of the many possible distributions that we can observe in reality. Further
work will focus on the identiﬁcation of the suﬃcient and necessary conditions on
the distribution function for the trade-oﬀ between equality of opportunity and
eﬃciency in the formation of human capital to exist.
17T h e s er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l ef r o mt h ea u t h o r su p o nr e q u e s t .
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(A1)






denotes the level of human
capital at the optimum for individual i.R e c a l lt h a tθi is diﬀerent for all individuals
and determines the extra cost of acquiring human capital based on socioeconomic
characteristics. Let, only as an example, these set of costs be determined by a
weighted average18 of two characteristics: the inverse of parent’s level of educa-
tion (εi) a n da ni n v e r s em e a s u r eo fh e a l t h(κi). That is: θi = δελ
i κ
1−λ
i , with λ
unknown. If parents level of education and health characteristics are observed for
each individual and we are able to proxy b(u∗
i) with test scores or an indicator of
years of schooling for each individual (si) then, the eﬀects of parents education
and health can be estimated from the log-linearization of the optimal amount of
human capital derived above. That is:
lnsi = γ ln
γ
δ(1 + γ)
− γλlnεi − γ(1 − λ)lnκi.
From the estimation of the above equation, a researcher can estimate the eﬀects
of diﬀerent characteristics of the individual on observed educational outcomes. In
many of the empirical studies reviewed in the introduction this is the form that
is estimated.
18It is not necessary that the weights add up to 1, but is a hypothesis that can be tested.
21(A2)
Existence of the equilibrium in the labor market
There exists a unique equilibrium solution under a fairly general context. The
market solution exists if there is a cost threshold θ
∗ which solves the following non






1 y−γf(y) and g(θ,γ,α,β)=
β
α(1 − F(θ)) and f(.) is the
cost density function.
First, note that k(.) is non decreasing in θ and that g(.) is non-increasing in
θ.T h u s ,k(.) − g(.) is non decreasing in θ.I ff(.) is integrable then k(.) − g(.) is
continuous and the image of the support of θ([1,S]) is a compact and a connected
subset of the real numbers. That is, the image is a bounded and closed interval
w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yI =[ a,b].S i n c ef(.) − g(.) is non decreasing, a = f(1,γ) −
g(1,γ,α,β)=−
β
α < 0 and b = f(S,γ) − g(S,γ,α,β)=Sγ R S
1 y−γdF(y) > 0.
Therefore, 0 ∈ I,t h a ti s ,t h e r ee x i s t sθ




Remark 1: The only assumption we need for the proof is that f(.) is Riemann
integrable. Continuous or piecewise continuous density functions are particular
cases of Riemann integrable functions.
Remark 2(uniqueness) : Note that the function k(.) is not strictly increasing
only in a particular case where
R θ∗
1 y−γf(y)=0 . If we assume, furthermore,
that the density is strictly positive on some interval [0,²] in the support of θ
then k(.) − g(.) is strictly increasing on the whole support of θ and is, therefore,
injective, meaning that there is a unique equilibrium solution. If that condition




< 0∀x ∈ [1,²] . Therefore, the equilibrium solution must lie
in the complement interval (²,S] on which the function k(.) − g(.) is now strictly
increasing.
Thus, there exist a unique solution to the market equilibrium whenever f(.) is
integrable.
22(A3)
Source: Thomas et al. (2000)
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Figure 5.1:
23Source: Thomas et al. (2000)
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